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CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS
THE SIXTH SESSION (PART Two) AND SEVENTH SESSION
OF THE CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE FRAMEWORK
CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE
The reconvened sixth session of the Conference of the Parties (COP-6bis) to the UN
Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) took place in Bonn fromJuly 16 to 27,
2001, under the presidency ofjan Pronk, Netherlands minister of housing, spatial planning,
and the environment. The meeting was noteworthy as the occasion for adopting the Bonn
Agreements on the Kyoto Protocol rules, a crucial juncture for entry into force of the prin-
cipal international instrument for reducing emissions of greenhouse gases. The rules were
adopted in final form as the Marrakesh Accords at the seventh session of the Conference of
the Parties (COP-7), held in Marrakesh, Morocco, from October 29 to November 9, 2001.
I. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE KYOTO PROTOCOL
The FCCC, which was adopted in 1992 at the UN Conference on Environment and Devel-
opment and entered into force in 1994, specifies an annual meeting of the parties to the
instrument.' The Third Conference of the Parties (COP-3) adopted the Kyoto Protocol, an
ancillary instrument to the Convention, in 1997. Annex B of the protocol sets out commit-
ments by twenty-one industrialized states (plus the European Union), as well as by eleven states
undergoing the process of transition to a market economy, to limit or reduce their emissions
of greenhouse gases-carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, and others. During the first
commitment period, which covers the years 2008 to 2012, the required reductions average
about 5 percent and range as high as 8 percent for particular countries, measured by refer-
ence to 1990 levels. The protocol also anticipates additional reductions in a second and subse-
quent commitment periods, although the specific obligations have not yet been negotiated.
The Fourth Conference of the Parties (COP-4), held in Buenos Aires in 1998, adopted a
plan of action to address remaining unfinished business that included a call for rules to im-
plement key provisions of the Kyoto Protocol. Because of the need for technical elaboration
of the protocol's broad-gauge requirements, agreement on the terms of the implementing
rules is critical to the ratification of the protocol by most, if not all, states with substantive
'UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, Art. 7, S. TREATY Doc. No. 102-38 (1992), 1771
UNTS 108, reprinted in 31 ILM 849 (1992) [hereinafter FCCC]; see generally Daniel Bodansky, The United Nations Frame-
worh Convention on Climate Change: A Commentary, 18 YALEJ. INT'L L. 451 (1993); Marian Nash (Leich), Contemporary
Practice of the United States, 87 AJIL 103 (1993). The FCCC, the Kyoto Protocol, and all other FCCC documents
cited herein are available online at <http://unfccc.int>.
' Kyoto Protocol to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 10, 1997, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/ 1997/
7/Add.2, reprinted in 37 ILM 22 (1998) [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol]; see generally Joanna Depledge, Tracing the
Origins of the Kyoto Protocol: An Article-by-Article Textual History, UN Doc. FCCC/TP/2000/2 (2000); MICHAEL
GRUBB WITH CHRISTIAAN VROLIJK & DUNCAN BRACK, THE KYOTO PROTOCOL: A GUIDE AND ASSESSMENT (1999);
SEBASTIAN OBERTHUR & HERMANN E. OTr, THE KYOTO PROTOCOL: INTERNATIONAL CIMATE POLICYFORTHE 21ST
CENTURY (1999); Clare Breidenich, Daniel Magraw, Anne Rowley, &James W. Rubin, TheKyoto Protocol to the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 92 AJIL 315 (1998); Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of
the United States, 93 AJIL 491 (1999).
' UN Doc. FCCC/CP/1998/16/Add.1 (1999).
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emission-reduction obligations under it. As of the end of COP-6, held in The Hague in No-
vember 2000 while the outcome of the U.S. presidential election was still uncertain, agree-
ment still had not been reached on decisions to implement the protocol. Consequently, par-
ties to the Convention agreed to convene a resumed sixth session in Bonn, the seat of the
Convention's secretariat, in 2001.
In late March 2001, the prospects for progress on rules implementing the Kyoto Protocol
darkened considerably when President Bush announced that the United States would not
ratify the protocol, which had been signed by the Clinton administration. As a condition pre-
cedent for entry into force, the protocol requires fifty-five ratifications representing 55 per-
cent of total carbon dioxide emissions from industrialized countries in 1990; emissions of
carbon dioxide from the United States account for slightly more than 36 percent of that
year's total. The support ofJapan, with somewhat more than 8 percent of 1990 emissions, was
consequently essential in order to salvage the protocol after the U.S. withdrawal.
II. THE BONN AND MARRAKESH NEGOTIATIONS
COP-6bis, at which delegations of 179 parties to the FCCC and two observer states were
joined by 1,587 representatives of 219 nongovernmental organizations, included routine
meetings of the Convention's Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI) and Subsidiary Body
for Scientific and Technical Advice (SBSTA). The Bonn meeting is of particular interest, how-
ever, because of the highly precarious status of the Kyoto Protocol rules at its start, and the
progress that had been made toward implementation by its end.
The Sixth Conference of the Parties (COP-6) had concluded in November 2000 with a
lengthy, heavily bracketed text reflecting considerable remaining disagreement on the ma-
jor issues relating to the rules for implementing the Kyoto Protocol.' Prior to the resumed
sixth session, President Pronk, "seek [ing] to present a comprehensive and balanced package
of draft decisions on all issues covered by the Buenos Aires Plan of Action," prepared a new,
consolidated set of negotiating texts.5 Also prior to that session, informal consultations be-
tween the president and the major negotiating groups were held in Scheweningen, the Neth-
erlands.
As in previous rounds of negotiations on climate change, the parties organized themselves
into a number of negotiating groups of varying degrees of cohesiveness. The fifteen mem-
ber states of the European Union (EU), including the delegation of the European Commis-
sion, operate as a formally coordinated unit, with the member state then holding the rotating
presidency-Belgium at both COP-6bis and COP-7-speaking for all the members. Central
Group 11 (CG-1 1) includes a number of Eastern European countries that are candidates for
EU accession. The Umbrella Group includes a variety of non-EU developed countries, among
them Australia, Canada, Iceland,Japan, New Zealand, Norway, the Russian Federation, and
the United States. (After President Bush's announcement concerning U.S. ratification, the
United States' formal position was to refrain from intervening or blocking consensus on mat-
ters related to the Kyoto Protocol unless U.S. interests were adversely affected or undesirable
precedents were created.) The Group of 77 (G-77) (which now includes over one hundred
developing countries), together with China, operates as a loosely structured grouping, with
Iran as chair during the Bonn negotiations. The Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) is
a coalition of forty-three small-island and low-lying coastal countries that share a vulnerabil-
ity to the adverse effects of global climate change. The alliance, which operates within the
larger framework of the G-77 and China, was chaired by Samoa at COP-6bis. An Environ-
mental Integrity Group, which comprises Mexico, South Korea, and Switzerland, emphasizes
the need to achieve "environmental integrity" in the work product resulting from the ongoing
negotiations on climate change under the auspices of the FCCC and the Kyoto Protocol.
' UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2000/5/Add.3 (vols. I-V) (2001).
5 UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2001/2/Rev.1 & Adds.1-6 (2001).
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At a high-level segment of COP-6bis beginning on Thursday,July 19 (the fourth day of the
session), eighty-eight countries were represented at the ministerial level. Late Saturday even-
ing, President Pronk presented a proposed text containing a "balanced package of [ministe-
rial-level] decisions." That was followed by private consultations between the president and
the various negotiating groups. After intense negotiations, ministers reached agreement in
the early morning hours of Monday,July 23, on an interrelated group of ministerial decisions
collectively known as the Bonn Agreements for the Implementation of the Buenos Aires
Plan of Action.6 The final version modified the president's proposal only with respect to the
text on compliance, which had been the principal source of disagreement among the min-
isters. After the departure of the ministers, negotiations resumed at the working level based
on the political agreement that the ministers had reached, but little, if any, further progress
was made. As of the end of COP-6bis, major political issues in the implementing rules and
guidelines had been resolved, but the texts of the decisions embodying them had not yet
been settled.
While the two-week negotiation at COP-7 in Marrakesh was likewise intense, the meeting
lacked the sense of uncertainty and high drama that characterized the Bonn session. Instead,
the Marrakesh meeting, held not long after the September 11 attacks on the World Trade
Center and the Pentagon, was characterized by a sense of quiet determination. COP-7's fo-
cus was on resolving the issues that remained after Bonn, thereby reaching agreement on the
final rules. On November 10, 2001, more than 170 governmental representatives of the par-
ties to the FCCC adopted by consensus the Marrakesh Accords, 7 a set of rules nearly two hun-
dred pages in length implementing the Kyoto Protocol and the Convention.
III. THE BONN AGREEMENTS AND MARRAKESH ACCORDS
The Bonn Agreements are divided into reasonably discrete, but nonetheless interrelated,
segments that track the major outstanding issues then awaiting resolution. The structure of
the agreements is somewhat unusual, coming at an intermediate juncture in the negotia-
tions on the rules implementing the Kyoto Protocol. Consequently, rather than being a com-
prehensive text of the Kyoto rules, the Bonn Agreements represent a delicately balanced
package designed to resolve a large number of discrete, contentious issues at the political
level, with the goal of breaking deadlocks preventing the adoption of the larger body of rules.
By contrast, the Marrakesh agreement is a unified set of rules intended to set out the com-
plete framework for implementing the Kyoto Protocol and the FCCC.
Funding for Developing Countries
One of the major policy issues concerning global climate change is that of providing fi-
nancial assistance to developing countries. The FCCC identifies the need for industrialized
states to provide financial resources and technology to assist developing countries in meet-
ing their obligations under the Convention, in complying with any future substantive obli-
gations, and in adapting to climate change.' The Kyoto Protocol embellishes this frame-
work9 but leaves the details to subsequent elaboration.
To date, the principal funding mechanism for climate-related activities, as well as the fund-
ing mechanism contemplated by the Convention, has been the Global Environment Facility
(GEF), a multilateral entity whose projects are developed and implemented by the World
Bank, the UN Development Programme, and the UN Environment Programme.'0 The United
6 UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2001/L.7 (2001).
'UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2001/13/Adds.I-4 (2002).
FCCC, supra note 1, Art. 4, paras. 3-10, & Art. 11.
Kyoto Protocol, supra note 2, Art. 11.
0 See generally Robin R. Churchill & Geir Ulfstein, Autonomous Institutional Arrangements in MultilateralEnviron-
mental Agreements: A Little-Noticed Phenomenon in International Law, 94 AJIL 623 (2000).
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States' announcement that it would not ratify the Kyoto Protocol was accompanied by a state-
ment that it did not intend to provide any funding for protocol-related activities. This U.S.
posture enhanced the complexity of the post-COP-6 negotiations by requiring clear segre-
gation of funds under the Convention and the protocol, respectively.
The Bonn Agreements and Marrakesh Accords call for an increase in the level of GEF fi-
nancing and create three new funds: a special climate-change fund; a least-developed-coun-
tries fund; and an adaptation fund." The first two will operate pursuant to the FCCC, and
the third, under the Kyoto Protocol. Consequently, parties to the Convention that decline to
ratify the protocol will nonetheless be eligible for financing through at least some of these
new channels. While contributions to the funding mechanisms under the Convention are
voluntary, the adaptation fund, operating under the protocol, will be partly financed by pro-
ceeds from the Clean Development Mechanism, described below. Ministers also agreed on
approaches to minimizing adverse social, er, vironmental, and economic effects on develop-
ing countries from the implementation of climate-change policies, identified assistance with
insurance for climate-related damage as a priority topic, and decided to establish an Expert
Group on Technology Transfer and a Least Developed Countries Expert Group.
The Bonn Agreements do not include specific levels of funding-an outcome seen by
developing countries as critically important. In a separate political statement referenced in
the Bonn Agreements, Canada, the EU, Iceland, New Zealand, Norway, and Switzerland
committed to contribute $410 million per year by 2005 and to reevaluate the level of funding
in 2008.Japan made a separate statement pledging to enhance its level of development assis-
tance by providing concessional credits for activities related to climate change.
Flexible Mechanisms
Among the novel features of the Kyoto Protocol areits "flexible mechanisms" designed
to reduce the cost of implementation by expanding the range of options available to states in
fulfilling their obligations under the agreement. The terms on which the protocol's flexible
mechanisms are structured can be expected to have a major impact on both the efficacy of the
agreement and the shape of international markets in emissions reductions.
The protocol's Annex B establishes legally binding targets and timetables in the form of
quantified emissions limitations and reduction commitments for greenhouse gases by indus-
trialized countries, each identified by name with an associated numerical commitment, to be
achieved by a deadline of 2012. To implement this obligation, the protocol anticipates an ini-
tial allocation of what have since come to be identified as "assigned amount units" (AAUs)
corresponding to each state party's legally binding cap.'2
The protocol establishes that rights to emit may be traded among the parties to the proto-
col that are identified in Annex I of the FCCC (a group that is similar, but not identical, to
those with identified emissions limitations in Annex B of the protocol). 3 This prerogative to
engage in international emissions trading (IET), the first of the flexible mechanisms, is one
" The special climate-change fund is designed to finance activities, programs, and measures undertaken by de-
veloping countries related to adaptation to climate change; transfer of technologies to combat or mitigate climate
change; efforts in the sectors of energy, transport, industry, agriculture, forestry, and waste management; and di-
versification of the economies of developing countries. The least-developed-countries fund is designed to assist
those countries in preparing and implementing their national action programs pursuant to the FCCC. The adap-
tation fund is intended to finance projects and programs designed to assist developing countries in responding
to the effects of climate change (including in the areas of water-resources management, land management, agri-
Culture, health, infrastructure development, fragile ecosystems, and integrated coastal zone management); in im-
proving the monitoring, control, and prevention for diseases whose incidence may be affected by climate change;
in building capacity with respect to the prevention, planning, and preparedness for climate-related disasters such as
droughts and floods; and in establishing and strengthening national and regional networks for rapid responses
to extreme weather events.
" Articles 5 and 7 of the Kyoto Protocol require Annex I parties to establish systems for calculating their green-
house gas emissions and to report them annually. The Marrakesh Accords contain standards for accounting and
reporting of emissions units in accordance with the flexible mechanisms.
'- Kyoto Protocol, supra note 2, Art. 17.
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of the protocol's important innovations. Second, the protocol permits Annex I parties to un-
dertake cooperative projects that reduce emissions of greenhouse gases in other Annex I
parties and to obtain credit for those reductions, an option known as 'joint implementation"
(JI).14 Like AAUs, the resulting "emission reduction units" (ERUs) are tradable. Third, the
protocol establishes a "clean development mechanism" (CDM),"5 which provides a basis for
Annex I parties to implement their reduction commitments by undertaking projects in de-
veloping countries. "Certified emission reduction units" (CERs) generated by such projects
may also be traded. The initial allocation of AAUs is fixed for each Annex B state in accor-
dance with the emissions limits established in the protocol. Trades of ERUs are zero-sum
transactions, with an increase in the allocation to the state of purchase offset by an equiva-
lent decrease for the state of sale. By contrast, CERs, which are generated by activities in de-
veloping countries that do not have emissions targets under the protocol, may increase the
total number of AAUs.
16
Because of the significance of the reduction obligations and the essentially unprecedented
nature of these schemes on the international level,' 7 the text concerning the flexible mecha-
nisms was subject to intense scrutiny and heated negotiations. The bulk of the discussion cen-
tered on terms of eligibility for, or access to, the mechanisms as vehicles for facilitating the
goals of the protocol.
For example, certain countries, most notably Russia, have large amounts of unused emis-
sions rights due to negative economic growth since the base year of 1990. Some have ques-
tioned the appropriateness of trading these excess emissions, occasionally informally and
pejoratively characterized as "hot air." Another issue was the extent to which a state may meet
its obligations by relying on trading instead of reductions in domestic emissions, an issue
known as "supplementarity." Analogously, a "commitment period reserve," which would pro-
hibit a state from trading more than a certain amount of its AAUs, was proposed as a fail-safe
in order to assure that states do not compromise their capacity to deliver on their reduction
obligations through overselling. Whether ERUs and CERs could be earned from nuclear
power projects was another source of disagreement. As a general matter, the EU has tended
to favor limited access to the flexible mechanisms on the theory of protecting the environ-
mental integrity of the reduction commitments, while the Umbrella Group countries of
Australia, CanadaJapan, and Russia have argued against restrictions as impeding economic
efficiency.
Under the rubric of equity, developing countries argued for the need to reduce nationalj
disparities in per capita emissions of greenhouse gases, differences that reflect dispropor-
tionately high consumption patterns in industrialized countries. Several issues relating to the
CDM were also of concern to developing countries: the desirability of giving priority to the
least-developed countries and to small island states that are particularly vulnerable to climate
change; the need for CDM-financed projects to provide resources in excess of existing foreign
aid ("additionality"); and the goal of achieving an equitable geographic distribution of projects.
I4 ld., Art. 6.
I' Id., Art. 12.
IS Article 4 of the Kyoto Protocol allows regional economic-integration organizations to reapportion their
obligations among their member states. This provision was drafted in anticipation of its utilization by the Euro-
pean Union (EU), which has adopted an internal agreement redistributing the EU member states' uniform reduc-
tion target of 8 percent. While non-EU states raised questions in Bonn (and also earlier) concerning the terms
of access to Article 4, the Marrakesh Accords do not treat the EU "bubble" as a mechanism subject to'potential
restrictions.
7 The Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16,1987,1522 UNTS 3, reprinted
in 26 ILM 1550 (1987) (as adjusted and amended, at <http://WW.uiep.ch/ozone/montreal.shtml), authorizes
limited reassignment of rights to emit the chlorofluorocarbons and other gases controlled by that agreement, but
the scale is not even close to that anticipated by the Kyoto Protocol. SeeElizabeth P. Barratt-Brown, Buildinga Moni-
toringand Compliance Regime Under the Montreal Protocol, 16YALEJ. INT'L L. 519 (1991). Title IV of the Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§7651-7651 o (1994), provides for extensive trading of rights to emit sulfur
dioxide, but that scheme is embedded in a municipal legal setting with much more obvious mechanisms for verifi-
cation, compliance, and enforcement.
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In the Bonn Agreements, ministers decided first to initiate a "prompt start" for both JI
and the CDM-that is, to allow access to these mechanisms in order to earn credits against
the first commitment period, perhaps even in advance of the protocol's entry into force. The
agreements specify that domestic action should constitute a "significant element of the ef-
fort" made by each party in implementing its obligations under the protocol, but without spec-
ifying a quantitative limitation on the use of the mechanisms. Eligibility for participation in
the flexible mechanisms will be limited to those states that are fulfilling their reporting and
other technical requirements and that have adhered to the compliance regime described
below. Nuclear projects will be excluded from eligibility under theJI scheme and the CDM.
Otherwise, host countries will be able unilaterally to determine, free from external over-
sight, whether particularJI or CDM projects facilitate sustainable development in accordance
with the protocol.
The commitment period reserve was set at 90 percent of a party's AAUs or 100 percent
of the level of the most recent emissions inventory, whichever is lower. As a consequence, most
countries cannot trade more than 10 percent of their emissions budget. Countries such as
Russia, whose actual emissions have fallen well below their budgets, are confined to trading
the difference between them. Two percent of the proceeds from each CDM project are to
be distributed, through the adaptation fund described above, to developing countries that
are particularly vulnerable to climate change.
As of the beginning of COP-7, among the key questions concerning the mechanisms was
"fungibility": whether the emissions units under all three flexible mechanisms-AAUs, ERUs,
and CERs-were interchangeable and freely tradable multiple times. Another was the capa-
city of a party to "bank" emissions units from one commitment period to another. In a com-
promise reflecting some parties' concerns about accounting for sinks, the negotiators created
a new "Removal Unit" (RMU), generated from sinks credits in Annex B countries, which can
be used only to meet a party's emissions target in the commitment period in which it is gener-
ated. CERs and ERUs can be banked up to a limit of 2.5 percent of a party's initially assigned
amount, and there is no restriction on banking AAUs. Depending on their interpretation,
the Marrakesh Accords may also accommodate the possibility of "unilateral" CDM projects,
undertaken without industrialized-state partners by developing countries, which can then
sell the resulting emissions credits.
Sinks
The world's forests serve as vast storehouses, or "sinks," for sequestering carbon. World-
wide loss of forest cover, by releasing this vast stockpile of carbon into the atmosphere as car-
bon dioxide, aggravates the greenhouse problem. Conversely, reversing deforestation and
creating new forested areas ("afforestation") can help to offset current levels of carbon emis-
sions. New forests, in absorbing carbon dioxide from the atmosphere during photosynthesis,
can contribute to climate stabilization by serving as supplementary reservoirs for carbon.
Shifts in agricultural practices can also result in releases or removals of carbon dioxide to or
from the atmosphere.
It is reasonably clear from a scientific perspective that preventing deforestation and encour-
aging forest conservation and afforestation are desirable public policies from the point of view
of climate stability. The treatment of sinks in the Kyoto Protocol, however, was a controversial
issue. By comparison with data on industrial sources such as power plants, national data on
forests and agricultural lands were spotty or nonexistent, and the methodologies for measur-
ing and reporting were not standardized. Even more fundamentally, the storage rate of bio-
spheric sinks was and is poorly understood, meaning that the contribution of forest- and
agriculture-related activity to a party's compliance with its protocol obligations would be
difficult to ascertain.
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Translated into the operative form of legal obligations, these considerations created sig-
nificant concerns about the reliability and transparency of reporting and verification, and
about the analytical integrity of the protocol's baselines and reduction obligations. During
negotiations, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States favored the inclusion
of sinks in the agreement, while the EUJapan, and developing countries generally opposed
that approach. The result was a compromise for the first commitment period of 2008-12 that
excludes sinks from the calculation of baselines, but that includes "direct human-induced
land use change and forestry activities, limited to afforestation, reforestation, and deforesta-
tion since 1990."'" The protocol leaves open the treatment of sinks in second and later com-
mitment periods that have yet to be negotiated, but specifies that a party "may choose" to ap-
ply such guidelines to the first commitment period as well.'9
The Bonn Agreements and Marrakesh Accords expressly address the question of sinks,
more precisely identified as land use, land-use change, and forestry (LULUCF). Although the
shape of the rules is constrained by the protocol's requirements, the treatment of sinks con-
tinned to be controversial during subsequent negotiations. The protocol's text leaves open
for subsequent resolution the treatment of agricultural activities-revegetation, cropland man-
agement, grazing-land management-and also of forest management other than afforesta-
tion and reforestation. Consistent with their positions in the protocol negotiations, the Um-
brella Group countries generally advocated liberal credits for carbon offsets in these areas,
with regard both to meeting their reduction obligations and to calculating credits in the CDM.
The EU and developing countries tended to oppose those proposals, although some devel-
oping countries supported at least some credits for sinks earned through the mechanism of
the CDM.
Consistent with its compromise character, and as demanded by members of the Umbrella
Group, the Bonn Agreements expanded the range of sink-related activities that operate to
fulfill a party's obligations, but with strict limitations. The ministers decided that these acti-
vities may, at each party's option, contribute toward that party's progress toward its reduction
target, provided that the activities are "human-induced" and have occurred since 1990.
Changes in agricultural patterns result in credits only to the extent that the net effect is to
sequester more carbon. Forest management (for example, conservation of existing forests)
is also subject to a global limitation of about 83 million tons of carbon per year, apportioned
by formula among Annex B countries other than the United States. On the controversial
issue of sinks in the CDM, ministers struck a deal that confines projects eligible for credits to
afforestation and reforestation during the first commitment period, without prejudice to the
second. Net credits earned for these sink-related activities in the CDM may not exceed 1 per-
cent of a party's base-year emissions, and the SBSTA is requested further to elaborate account-
ing methodologies for this category of activities. In Marrakesh, Russia successfully obtained
an increase in its ceiling for forest-management credits to roughly double what the Bonn
Agreements had allocated it. Contrary to the concerns of some parties, this concession did
not trigger a cascade effect from other countries demanding similar special treatment.
Compliance
A robust regime for ensuring compliance with the Kyoto rules is widely viewed as a critical
part of the overall package. This viewpoint reflects the perceived need for meaningful guar-
antees of strict implementation in order to assure the stability and predictability of markets
in emissions rights (AAUs, ERUs, CERs, and RMUs). Moreover, procedures and mechanisms
for compliance are the principal vehicle for assuring the integrity of other important features
s Kyoto Protocol, supra note 2, Art. 3, para. 3; see generally OBERTHR & OT, supra note 2, at 130-36.
' Kyoto Protocol, supra note 2, Art. 3, para. 4. There is also a special exception in Article 3, paragraph 7 for states
for which LULUCF constituted a net source of emissions in 1990, a provision inserted at the request of Australia.
See GRUBB, supra note 2, at 121.
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of the Kyoto Protocol, such as accounting and reporting obligations, and access to the flex-
ible mechanisms. The Kyoto compliance regime is unprecedented in the environmental
field and, more generally, breaks considerable new ground in international law and practice.
For this reason, and because of the importance of compliance to the full set of implement-
ing rules, compliance was the last issue to be resolved in the ministerial negotiations on the
Bonn Agreements.
The protocol itself does not address the question of compliance in detail, but instead de-
fers the issue to the Meeting of the Parties to the protocol. Prior to the Bonn meeting, there
was already agreement on the basic outlines of the regime to be contained in the Kyoto
rules. The principal institutional vehicle for encouraging implementation of the protocol's
rules will be a Compliance Committee comprising a facilitative branch and an enforcement
branch. The facilitative branch, as the name suggests, is intended to provide advice and as-
sistance to parties in complying with their obligations. This approach is similar to that of the
noncompliance procedure under the Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the
Ozone Layer,2" which has had some success in providing nonadversarial support to parties in
their efforts at compliance. The enforcement branch, which is intended to be more adjudi-
catory in character, has the power to reduce emissions budgets of a noncomplying party or
to suspend its eligibility to participate in the flexible mechanisms.
Notwithstanding a prior loose consensus on these basic outlines, there was considerable
divergence of opinion among the negotiators in Bonn. One important question concerned
the legal form of the compliance regime, with the EU advocating the adoption of a compli-
ance agreement, which would be mandatory for all protocol parties, prior to the protocol's en-
try into force. Umbrella Group countries that were less enthusiastic about binding legal con-
sequences-most notablyJapan-obtained language in the Bonn Agreements anticipating,
instead, a nonbinding decision concerning compliance. Indeed, this language was the most
contentious at COP-6bis, and the Marrakesh Accords defer the question of the legal form of
the compliance regime-whether a legally binding agreement or a nonbinding decision-un-
til the first Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol after the instrument's entry into force.
The most controversial of the remaining compliance issues addressed in Bonn concerned
the enforcement branch, perceived as having more powerful remedies available to it than the
facilitative branch. One major question was the "restoration rate" at which emissions units
would be deducted from the allocations of those states found to be in noncompliance with
their emission-reduction obligations. The EU and also some other states had argued for a
ratio of deductions to shortfalls as high as two to one, a deterrent to noncompliance. Other
delegations, chiefly from the Umbrella Group, characterized high restoration rates as puni-
tive and argued for setting the multiplier at, or closer to, one. In the end, a compromise was
reached: for the first commitment period, a restoration rate of 30 percent over the amount
by which a party fails to be in compliance, with the rate for subsequent commitment periods
subject to later negotiations. Developing countries also significantly furthered their nego-
tiating objectives in Bonn by securing the opportunity to appeal the enforcement branch's
decisions to the Meeting of the Parties "if a Party believes it has been denied due process."
IV. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES
The March 2001 decision of the Bush administration on behalf of the United States not to
ratify the Kyoto Protocol sent shock waves through the negotiating process at a criticaljunc-
ture, but ultimately did not derail adoption of the implementing rules. The United States-
the single largest national emitter of carbon dioxide (the principal greenhouse gas) and a
major economic power-remains an important component of any international effort to
20 Supra note 17; see, e.g., Sasha Thomas-Nuruddin, Protection of the Ozone Layer: The Vienna Convention and the Mon-
trealProtoco4 in ADMINISTRATIVEAND EXPERT MONITORING OF INTERNATIONAL TREATIES 113,124-27 (Paul C. Szasz
ed., 1999).
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control global warming. Further, the protocol will not enter into force absent ratification by
states representing 55 percent of total carbon dioxide emissions from industrialized coun-
tries in 1990; of this amount the United States accounts for more than a third. Moreover,
under the Clinton administration, the United States was a principal architect of the trading
scheme, the protocol's major structural innovation. Notwithstanding these impediments, the
protocol is expected to enter into force, perhaps in time for the World Summit on Sustain-
able Development, the so-called Rio + 10 meeting-a ten-year follow-up to the 1992 summit-
level UN Conference on Environment and Development-to be held in Johannesburg,
South Africa, from August 26 to September 4, 2002.21
Questioning the IPCC
An additional factor affecting the climate negotiations after COP-6 in The Hague was the
release of the Third Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC). That report, which concluded that the "Earth's climate system has demonstrably
changed on both global and regional scales since the pre-industrial era, with some of these
changes attributable to human activities,"22 reinforced the seriousness of the global-warming
problem. Notwithstanding the IPCC's broadly international character, its consensus-based
decision-making process, and its high degree of international respect,23 the Bush administra-
tion requested the U.S. National Academy of Sciences to review the IPCC's work product.
Instead of contradicting the panel's conclusions, the National Academy reaffirmed them,24
thereby negating any inference that the panel's conclusions had been politically motivated.
Policy Objections
While the Bush administration could hardly deny the seriousness of the global-warming
problem after the National Academy's report, or the scientific basis for the conclusion that
human activities are adversely affecting the world's climate, the president nonetheless
reiterated his opposition to the Kyoto Protocol mere days after the document's release. The
2 As ofJuly 24, 2002, seventy-six states representing 36 percent of Annex I emissions in 1990 have ratified or
acceded to the Kyoto Protocol.Japan and all EU member states have now ratified. See <http://unfccc.int/resource/
kpstats.pdf>. While not the only possible scenario leading to entry into force, ratifications by both Russia and Po-
land would now be sufficient to reach 55 percent.
22 See Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Climate Change 2001: Synthesis Report: Summary for
Policymakers, question 2 (2001), at <http://www.ipcc.ch/pub/tar/syr/001 .htm>. The IPCC, which metfor the first
time in November 1988, was created under the auspices of the UN Environment Programme and the World Mete-
orological Organization, with a mandate to study the climate-change issue primarily from a scientific perspective.
The IPCC's principal activities are divided among three working groups: a scientific one that addresses the causes
of climate change (Working Group I); one that studies the social and environmental impact of climate change
(Working Group II); and one that addresses response options for limiting greenhouse gas emissions and miti-
gating the effects of climate change (Working Group Il). The IPCC's First and Second Assessment Reports, released
in 1990 and 1995, respectively, at <http://www.ipcc.ch/pub/reports.htm>, provided much of the scientific basis
for the FCCC and the protocol.
"
5 For instance, the contribution of IPCC Working Group I to the Third Assessment Report had 122 lead authors
and coordinating lead authors, 515 contributing authors, 21 revieweditors, and 337 expert reviewers; was reviewed
by governments on a line-by-line basis; and was adopted by consensus. See Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change, Working Group I, Climate Change 2001: TheScientificBasis: TechnicalSummary (2001), at <http://www.ipcc.ch/
pub/wgTARtechsum.pdf>.
24The National Academy's report begins the summary of its findings with an unequivocal statement about glob-
al warming:
Greenhouse gases are accumulating in Earth's atmosphere as a result of human activities, causing surface
air temperatures and subsurface ocean temperatures to rise. Temperatures are, in fact, rising. The changes
observed over the last several decades are likely mostly due to human activities, but we cannot rule out that
some significant part of these changes is also a reflection of natural variability. Human-induced warming and
associated sea level rises are expected to continue through the 21st century.
Committee on the Science of Climate Change, National Research Council, Climate Change Science: An Analysis of
Some Key Questions 1 (2001), at <http://books.nap.edu/books/0309075742/html/>. The committee also stated
that it "generally agrees with the assessment of human-caused climate change presented in the IPCC Working
Group I ... scientific report." Id.
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Bush administration's June 2001 critique of the protocol 25 labeled it as "fundamentally
flawed" and identified five themes that were familiar from earlier debate on the greenhouse
issue, but that until that time had not precluded executive branch support for the protocol.
The subsequent adoption of the Marrakesh Accords can likewise be taken as an implied re-
jection of these objections by the rest of the states on the planet.
The Kyoto Protocol reduction targets-7 percent for the United States and an average of
roughly 5 percent for the industrialized world-are said to be "precipitous" because of the
increase in U.S. emissions during the last decade of the twentieth century, thereby necessi-
tating actual reductions of 30 percent from current emissions in order to reach the protocol's
target for the United States. This position ignores the fact that the FCCC, adopted nearly
a decade earlier, had already established the goal of limiting greenhouse gas emissions to
1990 levels.26 The U.S. share of the reduction goal is disproportionately small by reference
to its current emissions, which amounted to nearly a quarter of the global annual total of
carbon dioxide emissions from fuel combustion in the late 1990s.
From the broader perspective of environmental necessity, the protocol's goals can hardly
be said to be precipitous. Because of the long atmospheric lifetimes of the gases concerned,
significant reductions in emissions would be necessary merely to stabilize concentrations at
their current levels, let alone reverse the warming phenomenon. The long-standing criticism
of the supposedly inconclusive science underlying climate-change hypotheses-no longer even
remotely credible in the face of the overwhelming consensus of scientific opinionZV-has
been modified to address the lack of scientific support for the protocol's emissions targets.
In a literal sense, this criticism perhaps has some merit since the protocol's modest goals rep-
resent a political compromise that even at the time of adoption were understood as only a
first step toward environmentally meaningful reductions.
Yet another Bush administration criticism is that the Kyoto Protocol is ineffective in ad-
dressing climate change because it excludes developing countries. This objection mirrors
one presented in a 1997 Senate resolution.2" Developing countries are, to be sure, an impor-
tant component of a long-term strategy for protecting the global climate. Greenhouse gases
from this group of states are expected to constitute the largest source of future increases in
emissions. Nevertheless, industrialized countries represent the bulk of current and past green-
house gas emissions-a situation that has led most of the developing countries to object on
21 See ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, AN ANALYSIS OF THE KYOTO PROTOCOL 13-20 (2001), at <http://
www.epa.gov/globalwarming/publications/actions/usposition/bush-ccpol-061101 .pdf>.
26 See FCCC, supra note 1, Article 4 ("Commitments"), where parties recognize in paragraph 2(a) the need to
"return by the end of the present decade to earlier levels of anthropogenic emissions of carbon dioxide and other
greenhouse gases" and articulate in paragraph 2 (b) the "aim of returning [these emissions] individually orjointly
to their 1990 levels."
2 The most recent report of the IPCC's Working Group I, addressing the scientific explanation for global warm-
ing, concluded that" [t] here is new and stronger evidence that most of the warming observed over the last 50 years
is attributable to human activities." Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Working Group I, Climate Change
2001: The Scientific Basis: SummaryforPoliymakers 10 (2001), at <http://www.ipcc.ch/pub/spm22-01.pdf>; see supra
notes 22-24 and accompanying text. In the most recent of its periodic reports to FCCC parties, the United States
acknowledges that
[g] reenhouse gases are accumulating in Earth's atmosphere as a result of human activities, causing global
mean surface air temperature and subsurface ocean temperature to rise. While the changes observed over
the last several decades are likely due mostly to human activities, we cannot rule out that some significant part
is also a reflection of natural variability.
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, U.S. CLIMATE ACTION REPORT 2002: THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA'S THIRD
NATIONAL COMMUNICATION UNDERTHE UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORKCONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE 4 (2002),
at <http://www.epa.gov/globalwarming/publications/car/>.
28 See S. Res. 98,105th Cong., 143 CONG. REC. S8138 (1997) (adopted by vote of 95-0, specifying that "the United
States should not be a signatory to any protocol to, or other agreement regarding, the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change of 1992, at negotiations in Kyoto in December 1997, or thereafter, which would
... mandate new commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas emissions for the Annex I Parties [to the Con-
vention, consisting of industrialized states], unless the protocol or other agreement also mandates new specific
scheduled commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas emissions for Developing Country Parties within the
same compliance period").
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equity grounds to including substantive reduction obligations for them in the FCCC or the
protocol. Consequently, at the time of this writing, a nonnegotiable requirement for quan-
tified reductions from developing countries would amount to a "poison pill," impeding even
the modest first steps represented by the Kyoto Protocol. By contrast, a phased integration of
developing countries into a global regime to limit greenhouse gas emissions is a reasonable
goal that would be simultaneously responsive both to the environmental imperative and to
equity constraints.
It would be wrong to infer that developing countries are merely free riders under the cur-
rent international regime consisting of the FCCC and its protocol. The Convention includes
obligations for all parties to adopt programs to control greenhouse gas emissions and to ad-
dress emissions issues in specific sectors, such as energy, transport, industry, agriculture, for-
estry, and waste management.2 '9 Although the protocol does not contain substantive reduc-
tion obligations for developing countries, the CDM is designed to facilitate reductions in
emissions from those countries. Moreover, some developing countries, such as India and
China, have already begun to take voluntary steps to control emissions.30 The protocol antici-
pates the adoption of reduction obligations that have yet to be negotiated for a second and
subsequent commitment periods-which might well include quantified emissions limitations
for developing countries. Further, the Kyoto Protocol and Marrakesh Accords, by limiting par-
ticipation in the trading scheme to those parties with that have accepted emissions limita-
tions, contain incentives for parties to take on quantified targets.
Alleged economic harm to the U.S. and global economies, amounting to as much as 4
percent of U.S. GDP, is another stock criticism reiterated in the Bush announcement. Other
analyses-particularly after the Bonn and Marrakesh meetings, at which concessions were
made to some developed states in order to secure broad participation-suggest that concerns
about the cost of implementation may be overstated.3 The United States' final objection,
namely, that the protocol would leave it "dangerously dependent on other countries to meet
its emission targets,"32 is disingenuous at best. The protocol's flexible mechanisms were orig-
inally adopted at the insistence of the United States, over the objections of the EU, as a strat-
egy for controlling the costs of reductions.
Subsequent Developments
Having completed its own review of the climate-change issue, the White House in Feb-
ruary 2002 released a new Clear Skies and Global Climate Change Initiative."5 Instead of
reducing emissions from a fixed baseline, the Bush proposal would lower the intensity of
greenhouse gases, defined as "the ratio of greenhouse gas emissions to economic output,"
from today's 183 metric tons per million dollars of GDP, to 151 by 2012. The proposal in-
cludes such voluntary and incentive-based features as tax credits for investments in renew-
able energy, and calls for a reassessment of needs in 2012, the end of the first commitment
period under the Kyoto Protocol. It is not yet clear whether the Bush proposal could be
meshed with the Kyoto approach; in the former, emissions limits are keyed to economic
performance, a formula that may even allow actual emissions to increase if economic activity
is sufficiently vigorous.
" FCCC, supra note 1, Art. 4, para. 1 (b), (c).
30 See generally U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, MINORITY STAFF, COMM. ON GOVERNMENT REFORM AND OVER-
SIGHT, FIVE MYTHSABOUT DEVELOPING COUNTRIESAND CLIMATE CHANGE, at<http://www.hotse.gov/waxman/clim/
gwfact7.htm>.
"' See, e.g., Steven Chase, Meeting Kyoto Targets Will Cost Far Less Than Critics Predict, Report Says, TORONTO GLOBE
AND MAIL, Mar. 13, 2002, at A8 (Dutch government report on cost of compliance by Canada); see generally DANIEL
BODANSKY, U.S. CLIMATE POLICY AF-rER KYOTO: ELEMENTS FOR SUCCESS (Carnegie Foundation for International
Peace Apr. 2002), at <http://www.ceip.org/files/pdf/Policybriefl5.pdf>.
12 ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, supra note 25, at 14.
" See White House Fact Sheet: President Bush Announces Clear Skies & Global Climate Change Initiative (Feb.
14, 2002), at <http://%WW.whitehonse.gov/news/releases/2002/02/20020214.html>.
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More or less simultaneously, the Bush administration declined to support the candidacy of
Robert Watson, a U.S. citizen, for a subsequent term as chair of the IPCC. To a storm of in-
ternational controversy, Watson-one of the world's leading climate scientists who, in addi-
tion to his previous experience in the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and
then in the Clinton White House, is currently director of the World Bank's Environment
Department-was replaced by Indian scientist Rajendra Pachauri, director general of a pri-
vate research organization, the Energy Research Institute, in New Delhi, India.
V. NEXT STEPS AND LONG-TERM IMPACT
More so perhaps than for most international pacts, the Bonn Agreements are distinguished
by the very fact that they exist. After the disappointing and inconclusive end to COP-6 in The
Hague, followed by the United States' announcement that it would not ratify the Kyoto Pro-
tocol, it was widely reported that the protocol was doomed never to enter into force.34 Con-
sequently, although there might be some dispute as to whether the Bonn Agreements should
be considered, as some have asserted, the most important international environmental in-
strument ever, there is little doubt that the high drama associated with the genuine uncer-
tainty about the likelihood of reaching a consensus has rarely been equaled
Had the outcome of the Bonn and Marrakesh negotiations been other than what it was,
the prospects for the protocol would likely have been grim indeed. As things turned out, how-
ever, the outlook for the protocol's success is considerably better than it was before Bonn and
Marrakesh. Notwithstanding the withdrawal of the United States, it is still possible that fifty-
five ratifications representing 55 percent of 1990 carbon emissions from Annex I states can
be obtained, which would allow the protocol to enter into force. Indeed, although there is
little margin for error, entry into force appears to be a realistic possibility; the implementing
rules and guidelines contain obligations that are sufficiently specific that states with substan-
tive obligations under the agreement feel that it is possible for them to complete their domes-
tic processes of ratification.
In Bonn and Marrakesh, the EU was clearly the most committed to reaching consensus on
rules that would elaborate the Kyoto framework in sufficient detail to enable domestic rati-
fication of the agreement by the EU itself, by its member states, and by other Annex B coun-
tries with numerical emissions targets. The G-77 and China were also supportive. The Um-
brella Group countries were generally more equivocal, and because Japan's support was key
to reaching agreement, its role was pivotal. Prior to and during the Bonn conference, there
were conflicting accounts of Japan's position-reports that emanated, in part, from a summit-
level meeting with the United States immediately beforehand. At the meeting itselfJapan
was viewed, perhaps somewhat starkly, as presented with an uncomfortable choice between
the United States and the rest of the world. Reflecting her crucial role in the negotiation, the
Japanese environment minister was greeted with sustained applause in the celebratory ple-
nary following her agreement to the text.
The Bonn Agreements have also been widely cited as emblematic of the EU's capacity to
exercise global leadership in the absence of U.S. support for multilateral initiatives. Dubbed
by some participants "The Mission to Rescue the Kyoto Protocol," COP-6bis has since become
a larger metaphor for the potential of multilateral cooperation, asjuxtaposed against a go-it-
alone unilateralism embodied by the United States. Notwithstanding the dire advance pre-
dictions for the outcome of the meeting, and despite the opposition of the United States,
there was no formal discussion at the Bonn conference of abandoning the protocol and
considering an alternative approach. Somewhat ironically, hostility from the United States
seemed to invigorate the determination of other countries to make the Kyoto regime work.
See, e.g., S. Fred Singer, Is Kyoto Dead? WASH. TIMES, May 6, 2001, at B4; David G. Victor, Piety at Kyoto Didn't
Cool thePlanet, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2001, at A19.
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It is possible that the purely environmental significance of the resulting Marrakesh Ac-
cords is, as some have asserted,35 attenuated by necessary compromises that had the effect of
reducing the magnitude of the Kyoto Protocol's already modest reduction commitments.
But it was clear that without those concessions the protocol would no longer be available as
both a contemporary vehicle and an ongoing framework for further progress on the pres-
sing problem of climate change. As the situation stands now, there is at least reason to be
optimistic that states and governments will gain useful experience within a policy and legal
structure that can serve as a meaningful tool for negotiating more aggressive reductions in
the future. Indeed, the increasing vigor over time of treaty regimes such as the FCCC and
Kyoto Protocol is a consistent theme in international environmental law and policy.
More generally, the Marrakesh Accords may prefigure the future of international environ-
mental negotiations. In their level of particularity and prescriptiveness, the Kyoto rules have
very much the character of what in the United States would be considered administrative
regulations, or in the United Kingdom, secondary legislation. Leaving aside the political sig-
nificance of their adoption, the Bonn Agreements and Marrakesh Accords are noteworthy
for their high level of technical complexity, extensive use of specializedjargon, and lengthy
enumeration of a mass of apparent minutiae. Indeed, the text would be nearly incomprehen-
sible to almost anyone not directly involved in the negotiating process.
But the Bonn Agreements and the Marrakesh Accords very much reflect the dynamics of
the negotiation, in which governments approached with gravity the terms that would define
their obligations to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Notwithstanding more than a decade
of international attention in the form of the FCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, states behave
as if an enormous amount is at stake even at the very high level of detail of the Kyoto rules.
Governments even of small countries send large delegations to the conferences of the parties
and devote intense staffing resources to climate-policy implementation at the domestic level.
One important question that has yet to be answered is the long-term compatibility or con-
vergence between the Kyoto Protocol, on the one hand, and unilateral U.S. policies, on the
other. During the Clinton administration, a moderately enthusiastic executive branch en-
countered considerable hostility in the Congress. Given the likely need for legislative action
to implement the Kyoto Protocol, that opposition appeared to be a well nigh insurmount-
able barrier. Somewhat ironically, at the same time that the Bush administration has taken a
hostile attitude toward the Kyoto Protocol and reversed its predecessor's position, the Con-
gress has warmed somewhat to policy action to protect the global climate. Moreover, some
states and municipalities have begun to take their own initiatives. An additional important
factor, whose magnitude is as yet difficult to ascertain, is the potential cost to U.S. business
interests from remaining outside the Kyoto trading scheme.
Overall, there is a sense of optimism that an agreement of this immense technical com-
plexity can be agreed upon by a consensus of the representatives of nearly two hundred states.
Simultaneously, the Bonn Agreements and Marrakesh Accords are very much a political deal,
characterized by an enormous network of interlaced linkages and trade-offs. As with any
process involving compromise, the result is less satisfying than some would like. Realistic ex-
pectations focus on the Kyoto Protocol's future promise, as to which the forecast, though now
brighter, is still clouded by uncertainty.
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